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Abstract 
 
The effect of globalisation on inflation is modelled and simulated for ten 
countries from G10 during the Great Moderation period. The results are 
supportive of the globalisation hypothesis. In particular, the results show that 
dynamic channels and magnitudes of globalisation to domestic inflation are 
highly heterogeneous from country to country, that increases in trade openness 
could be either inflationary or deflationary, while increased imports from low-
cost emerging-market economies have been mostly deflationary, and that there 
has been almost no direct globalisation impact as far as inflation persistence is 
concerned while the impact on inflation variability can be positive as well as 
negative. Overall, globalisation is shown to have contributed positively to the 
aspect of low inflation rather than that of stable inflation during the Great 
Moderation era. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of globalisation on inflation of the last two decades 
constitutes one of the unsettled issues in the recent debate over the state of 
macroeconomics in the wake of the latest global recession triggered by the 
2008 financial crisis. It relates particularly to the discussion of whether the 
state of low and stable inflation in many developed economies of the West 
since the early 1990s, a period referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’ (see 
Bernanke, 2004), should be credited to the success of domestic 
macroeconomic policies or simply to the rising global supply of cheap 
manufactured goods from those rapidly developing economies such as China 
(see, eg McCarthy, 2007; White, 2008; Bean, 2010). Should globalisation be a 
major factor in driving domestic inflation, standard monetary theories of 
inflation could be invalidated, eg see Wang and Wen (2007).1  
It is a well-known fact that there exists a considerable degree of 
correlation in the inflationary processes among many developed countries, as 
shown from Table 1 of the Western countries of G10. When it comes to 
econometric model results, however, the evidence is inconclusive concerning 
the hypothesis of whether globalisation has indeed significantly contributed to 
the inflation dynamics of these economies. For example, while supportive 
evidence are presented in Pain et al (2006, 2008), Borio and Filardo (2007), 
Pehnelt (2007), Wang and Wen (2007), and also partially in Ciccarelli and 
Mojon (2010), negative results are reported by Ball (2006) and Ihrig et al 
(2010). 
The present investigation seeks to sharpen the evidence by improving, in 
two key respects, the empirical rigour of modelling the globalisation effects on 
inflation. First, domestic inflation is modelled at a country-by-country level 
with a careful choice of the variables representing globalisation. The LSE 
general-to-specific dynamic specification approach is adopted to ensure 
empirical robustness of the end model choice. The G10 economies except 
                                                 
1 See also White (2009) for a more general critique. 
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Japan form the objects of our investigation and quarterly data are used. Second, 
model simulations are carefully constructed to illustrate the globalisation 
effects. In particular, a novel simulation is designed to evaluate the 
disaggregate import effects from the low-cost emerging-market economies. 
The design overcomes a key weakness in the existing practice of macro model 
simulations – the lack of cross-country price level differences from the 
aggregate price indices. 
In short, our modelling experiment has resulted in relatively robust 
inflation models for the most of ten economies during the Great Moderation 
period. In all the ten cases, the responsiveness of inflation to import prices has 
been statistically significant; and in eight out of the ten cases, foreign trade 
openness has been also found significant. Moreover, the model simulation 
results show that both the trade openness and rising imports from the 
emerging-market economies have exerted sizeable effects on the level and 
variability of inflation but that globalisation has impacted little as far as 
inflation persistence is concerned. On the whole, the evidence that we have 
produced is sufficiently strong to support the globalisation hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes 
our modelling method and the related data issues; the subsequent section 
discusses our model simulation designs and the related data measurement 
issues; the empirical results concerning globalisation are discussed in section 4, 
which is followed by a short section summarising the main findings. 
2. Modelling strategy and data issues 
Most of the existing empirical studies are based on extended Phillips 
curve models, eg Ball (2006), Borio and Filardo (2007), Pehnelt (2007), Ihrig 
et al (2010), Guerrieri et al (2010) and Mihailov et al (2011). One theoretical 
weakness of the type of Phillips curve models is the absence of explicitly 
specified long-run disequilibrium effect on the inflation dynamics. The long-
run effect is included in the form of an error-correction term in the models by 
Pain et al (2006, 2008). We shall follow their step. Analyses based on 
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common factor models have also become popular, eg see Ciccarelli and Mojon 
(2010). However, common factor models or correlation-based analyses do not 
separately identify the effects of domestic versus foreign factors, whereas the 
separation is crucial in our present country-specific investigations. It is, 
nevertheless, interesting to note that Ciccarelli and Mojon have employed an 
error-correction mechanism to relate domestic inflation rates to global 
inflation. 
The issue of how to represent globalisation in models is arguably the 
most crucial here. Various channels of globalisation has been discussed in the 
literature, such as import price path-through, global output slacks, global 
competition via labour and capital markets. However, it is evident from 
numerous empirical studies that the globalisation effect on domestic inflation 
is mainly through overseas goods market imbalance or disequilibrium. Four 
variables are usually used to capture such imbalance – foreign output gaps, 
trade openness indicators, import price and common factors from cross-
country inflation series. We shall adopt only two here – import price and trade 
openness indicators. Foreign output gaps are disregarded on both theoretical 
and empirical considerations. Theoretically, our aim is to model how much 
inflation of a specific country is affected by foreign markets, rather than how 
much global inflation is affected by global market supply and demanding 
conditions. Therefore, prices from abroad should contain adequate and timely 
information on the global market conditions. Empirically, data on foreign 
output gaps are not directly collected but indirectly derived. The derivation 
lacks a unanimously accepted formula; and the available modelling evidence 
using the data is disappointing, eg see Calza (2009) and Ihrig et al (2010), 
owing possibly to rather high degrees of measurement errors involved in the 
derivation. Global inflation is derived from common factor models in Mumtaz 
and Surico (2008), and also Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010). The latter study 
further uses the common factor as a leading indicator to predict inflation of 
each country in a panel of twenty-two developed economies. While latent 
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common factors do capture certain amount of the global inflationary effect, the 
method suffers from two shortcomings – limited sample representation of 
global inflation through exclusion of mainly the majority of developing 
economies in panels from which the factors are derived, and failure to exclude 
the inflation data of each economy to be modelled from the common factor, 
making it difficult to identify the factor as purely a foreign price variable. 
We thus start the modelling experiment with import price since it is the 
least controversial and the most commonly used variable to capture the foreign 
trade effect.2 Denoting itP  as the aggregate price index, itp  its logarithm and 
itpΔ  as inflation for country i under study, we take the following general form 
of an error-correction model:  
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where itw  is the logarithm of wage index, itW , 
M
itp  the logarithm of the import 
price index, MitP , 
G
ity  the domestic output gap, and itu  the unemployment rate. 
The wage index is used as a proxy of domestic costs, eg see Pain et al (2006, 
2008). Obviously, it is impossible to rule out any foreign impact on wages, as 
pointed out by Ihrig et al (2010). However, simple correlation analyses show 
that the degree of correlation in cross-country wage rates is notably smaller 
than that of inflation on average, eg see Table 2 versus Table 1. It should be 
noted that (1) resembles an extension of typical augmented Phillips curve 
models by an 1−itec  term. Here, model (1) also generalises model [A1.1] in 
Pain et al (2006) in three aspects: (a) It does not impose static homogeneity in 
the 1−itec  term; (b) it allows for more than one lag of 
G
ity ; and (c) it considers 
itu  since it was a key variable in the original Phillips’ curve prior to the 
                                                 
2 In fact, Pain et al (2008) conclude that the indirect effect through import prices seems to be 
the only channel through which foreign economic conditions affect consumer price inflation. 
 6 
invention of Gity  and since empirical evidence of the role of 
G
ity  has not been 
unquestionably strong. However, model (1) excludes certain variables, such as 
energy and food price inflation, which have been considered in the literature, 
eg see Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al (2010). The exclusion is based 
on the observation that inflation series of these prices tend to be considerably 
correlated with those of import prices, as shown in Table 3. The correlation 
makes it incoherent not to interpret the significance of the food and energy 
price inflation variables as evidence of globalisation.  
Obviously, ijβ  and 2iκ  in (1) form our parameters of interest here and 
evidence of 0≠ijβ  and/or 02 >iκ  is confirmatory of the globalisation 
hypothesis. However, a more interesting and specific facet of the hypothesis is 
that the impact of Mitp  could increase with the growth of trade while the roles 
of those domestic factors decrease. Many existing studies test the facet by 
comparison of sub-sample estimation results, which basically follows the 
time-varying parameter approach. Unfortunately, the approach suffers from 
the drawback of neglecting the possibility of time-varying parameter estimates 
being the result of model mis-specification. It also makes it difficult to further 
apply models for simulation or projection purposes. Hence, we intend to try 
and obtain constant-parameter models by isolating the effect of trade 
intensification through appropriate variable choice. Besides, the limit of our 
attention to the Great Moderation era should help reduce the risk of significant 
parameter shifts. Specifically, we postulate an alternative model to (1) by 
introducing a trade-ratio based openness index, Oitr , as a measure of increasing 
import penetration, similar to what Pain et al (2006, 2008) and Ihrig et al 
(2010) have done:  
(2) 
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where weighted variables are denoted by circumflex. For example, 
( )OitGitGit ryy −= 1~ . Noticeably, itW  and MitP  can be weighted by either 
arithmetic weight or geometric weight. The former is adopted here, ie 
( )OitMitMit rPp ln~ =  and ( )( )Oititit rWw −= 1ln~ , after experimenting with both. 3 
Other variations of (2) should also be possible depending on which parameters 
in (1) are potentially most susceptible to trade-induced shifts. For example, 
Pain et al (2006, 2008) only consider the case of weighted long-run 
parameters, ie: 
(2a) 
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Ihrig et al (2010) experiment with adding weighted Gity~  and 
M
itp~  to an 
augmented Phillips curve models rather than replace the relevant un-weighted 
variables (their model does not have the error-correction term). We shall 
experiment with several variations of model (2) with different mixture of 
weighted explanatory variables, for example, one with only the short-run 
variables weighted and another with only the long-run variables weighted. 
Many existing studies adopt simply the a priori dynamically specified 
inflation models, for example those which follow the New Keynesian 
theoretical approach. We believe it mainly an a posteriori matter to 
appropriately specify the dynamic structure of a model, especially its short-run 
structural part, see Hendry and Richard (1982, 1983), Hendry et al (1984). In 
order to search for empirically robust model specifications, especially in the 
present case where we face multiple possible model variations, it is essential 
to put in place a set of criteria for model choice. The criteria that we adopt are 
based on the LSE general-to-specific model specification approach, see 
Hendry (1995). Specifically, model reduction via ‘testimation’ by the general-
                                                 
3 We find models with geometric weighted variables usually result in larger residuals and 
much worse simulation results than models with arithmetic weighted variables. 
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to-specific approach is carried out for (1) and several variations of (2). The 
resulting simplified models are assessed especially for having (a) correct signs 
of the long-run parameters and the negative feedback parameter of the 1−itec  
term, and (b) relatively constant parameter estimates, in addition of passing all 
the commonly used diagnostic tests. When more than one such data-coherent 
model is found for one country, encompassing tests are performed to assist the 
end model selection. 
The above modelling strategy is applied to ten countries of the G10: 
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Italy (ITA), 
Netherlands (NLD), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), the UK and the US. 
Japan is left out here because of its post-1990 idiosyncratic experience of 
deflationary recession, eg see McKinnon and Ohno (2001). Quarterly data is 
collected for the period 1985-2010. Annual inflation, the modelled variable 
itpΔ , is calculated from CPI series in line with most of the existing studies. 
We shall skip a general description of the inflation dynamics since the late 
1980s up to the recent global recession, because that has been adequately 
covered in various recent studies, such as IMF (2006), Melick and Galati 
(2006), Pain et al (2006, 2008), White (2008) and Bean (2010). The only 
aspect that we want to emphasise here is that there is a visible increase of 
cross-country correlations in inflation since the late 1990s (see Table 1), 
especially compared to the cross-country wage rate correlations shown in 
Table 2, and that the increase is coupled with an increase in the cross-country 
import prices, as shown from Table 3.  
There are mainly three ways of defining the openness index: the ratio of 
imports to GDP, the ratio of imports to GDP plus imports and the ratio of 
imports plus exports to GDP plus imports.4 We have tried all three and found 
from our sample calculation that the three carry virtually identical trends with 
                                                 
4 The KOF index of globalization compiled by Swiss Economic Institute is used to represent 
openness in Pehnelt (2007). However, the index is only in annual frequency and the series 
exhibit less variation than the three indicators discussed here. 
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99% correlation on average. We shall adopt the ratio of imports to GDP plus 
imports as the openness index here for its relative closeness to representing 
import penetration. Figure 1 shows the ten openness series (the solid curves), 
and a rising trend is discernable from the figure of all the countries except for 
Canada prior to the 2008 recession, although the degrees of openness differ a 
great deal across the ten economies, with Belgium and the Netherlands 
enjoying relatively high degrees while the US remaining at a very low degree. 
Detailed definitions and sources of the other explanatory variables in (1) and 
(2) are given in the appendix. 
Overall constancy of parameter estimates is one of our top concerns. 
Significant shifts of parameter estimates are reported in several of the existing 
studies. In particular, a significant shift is reported in the inflation process of 
the OECD countries in the mid 1990s in Pain et al (2006, 2008). To detect 
such shifts, recursive estimation and sequential Chow tests are employed in 
our initial modelling experiment using the data sample of 1985-2010. The 
experiment has indeed revealed significantly shifting parameter estimates 
during the early part of the sample. To verify that the shifts are not just the 
symptom of initially small subsamples of the recursive estimation procedure, a 
sequence of general-to-specific model reduction experiments is carried out, 
each with a decreased sample by one year from 1985. The experiments show 
that severe model fluctuations have receded once the sample is reduced to 
1992-2010. Although our focal concern is the globalisation effect on inflation 
during the Great Moderation era, we have kept the post-2008 observations 
mainly for the purpose of examining parameter constancy. Italy is the only 
economy which exhibits certain visible parameter shift in 1995 from recursive 
estimation. Our finding suggests that much of the model fluctuations is 
probably due to the economic downturn in the West from the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s, and the finding also confirms to Bean’s (2009) demonstration of 
the post-1992 period being the ‘Great Moderation’ era. Henceforth, we set the 
data sample to 1992-2010 for our main modelling exercise. 
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Panel or pooled-sample estimation is commonly used in the existing 
studies. Such exercise actually imposes identical key parameters and 
homogeneous model format. To assess the validity of those imposed 
assumptions, we conduct general-to-specific model reduction on individual 
countries first before considering the possibility of applying the panel method. 
It turns out through our extensive model reduction exercise that both the 
model form and parameter estimates vary so considerably across the ten 
economies, including those long-run static parameter estimates, that there 
lacks adequate basis to impose identity on key parameters of interest with 
panel, pooled-sample or system-of-equations estimation. Table 4 reports the 
key regression results from the model reduction exercise. The model versions 
given in the table are only those which have passed various diagnostic and 
encompassing tests. Most of those routine test results are omitted from the 
table due to lack of space. The parameter estimates in bold indicate that the 
corresponding variables are weighted by the openness index, and therefore the 
corresponding model version is a variation of model (2). It should be noted 
that UK is the only country where two versions are reported, one from (1) and 
the other from (2), as encompassing tests fail to indicate which one 
outperforms the other.5 Notice also that long-run static homogeneity does not 
hold for all countries. 
3. Model simulation design and data measurement issues 
Successful search for data-coherent models will not only help shed light 
on why some of the previous empirical studies have resulted so diverse 
findings, but also enable us to conduct counterfactual model simulations to 
illustrate how much globalisation has affected domestic inflation. Such 
illustrations will facilitate quantitative assessments of the dynamic impact of 
particular driving variables of interest which are otherwise difficult to achieve 
directly from the estimated models. 
                                                 
5 Note that the long-run relation is identical for both models (1) and (2) in the UK case. 
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The common route of simulating the globalisation effects is via 
counterfactual shocks of certain external price series. For example, a decrease 
in the import price variable by a fixed percentage or a decrease of a major 
component of the import price such as the oil price or the commodity price 
index, eg see IMF (2006) and Pain et al (2006, 2008). However, it is 
impossible to quantitatively evaluate from those simulations to what extent the 
increasing imports from the relatively low-cost emerging market has affected 
inflation in the developed economies. Nickell (2005) and Pain et al (2006, Box 
1) propose to evaluate the impact of imports from a certain group of countries 
by making use of the individual foreign price and trade weight components of 
the import price variable of a country under study. However, neither study has 
actually carried out a simulation along this line to illustrate the import impact 
from the emerging markets. 
Here, we shall extend their proposed method to try and design 
simulations which will illustrate quantitatively how much the low inflation 
episode in the ‘Great Moderation’ era was related to the relatively low priced 
goods imported from the emerging markets. To that end, we first construct an 
import price series for each country using the export prices of most of the 
trading partners to country i: 
(3)  
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where Xjtp  denotes the US dollar denominated export prices in logarithm of 
those foreign countries trading with country i and jtw  their trading weights. 
We aim at having the constructed price series in (3), when converted into the 
domestic currency, approximate well of MitP , ie 
M
it
M
it PP ≈ˆ . Next, we exploit (3) 
to decompose the set of trading partners into two groups: one for the 
emerging-market economies, Ej∈ , and the rest the developed countries, 
Di∈ , with 0; =∩=∪ EDNED :  
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The decomposition will enable us to carry out counterfactual simulations 
through fixing the values of EtW  and EtΠ  respectively to evaluate the direct 
impact of imports from the emerging-market economies. 
Thirty-two economies are included in the trade set for the calculated 
import prices by equation (3) (see the appendix for the list and data sources). 
In addition to the eleven countries of the G10, the rest economies are selected 
because of their relatively high ranks in import shares of the ten G10 countries 
to be modelled according to the Direction of Trade data released by the IMF. 
These include Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, the Czech Republic, China, 
France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, 
Canada, Hong Kong, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States and Taiwan. The trade set covers about 80% of the 
total imports for each of the G10 country on average. The closeness of these 
calculated import price series to the published import prices are shown in 
Figure 2. To further decompose the calculated prices by (4), the trade set is 
divided into two subsets, with the developed economy set comprising the G10 
plus Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and 
Spain, and the rest forming the emerging-market set.  
Now, a major problem arises when it comes to the decomposition 
equation (4): all the individual country export price indices are based on 
2005=100, which effectively removes the differences in the aggregate price 
levels between the developed economies and the emerging-market economies. 
In other words, aggregate price indices reflect no information on the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) between countries by definition. To circumvent 
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the problem, we make use of the PPP conversion factors for the year 2005 
estimated by the World Bank (2008, Table 1.a) for around 150 countries. We 
are aware of the imprecise nature of using the World Bank factors here as 
these factors are estimated on the basis of both the service and goods prices of 
the domestic economies concerned while the price indices that we intend to 
convert are export prices only. But these factors are the best available 
aggregate ones and it is not unrealistic to assume that the export price level of 
an economy should be at par with its domestic price level in general. From a 
cross-section sample perspective, the World Bank estimates can be regarded 
as providing a set of PPP-based weights on the cross section of year 2005, 
whereas the panel of aggregate price indices which have been used in the 
calculated price series assume equal weights for all economies in 2005. 
Provided that the sample of 32 economies in our panel is adequately 
representative of the World Bank sample, recalculation of the price series by 
reweighting the individual price series using the World Bank PPP-based 
factors should not generate substantial differences from the result using the 
un-weighted ones.6 Figure 3 illustrates the decomposed series of EtΠ  and DtΠ  
calculated by using the World Bank PPP-based factors to reweight all the 
export price series of the emerging-market economies in our trade subset. 
Noticeably, the gaps between the two sets of series are as wide as 50 on 
average.  
Since for a few emerging market economies, the earliest available trade 
data start in 1994. Our counterfactual simulations are run for the period of 
1994Q1 to 2008Q3, ie the main part of the Great Moderation era prior to the 
latest global recession. We begin by running a baseline simulation in which 
we substitute the actual series of the import price indices by those series 
                                                 
6 The recalculation is tried for several of the G10 countries and the results show that the un-
weighted and the weighted series are indeed very close.  
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constructed by (3).7 This is to separate the errors owing to the deviations of the 
calculated indices from the actual indices out of the subsequent simulations. 
Next, three scenarios are designed to illustrate the globalisation impacts of 
three factors respectively: (i) the openness index by setting Oitr fixed to its 
initial value at the beginning of the simulation, (ii) the trade shares by setting 
EtW  to its initial value at the beginning of the simulation and (iii) the 
disaggregate import prices by setting EtΠ = DtΠ . Figures 4-6 and Table 5 
summarises the simulated results. 
A word of caution is necessary here before we move on to the next 
section. Simulations are limited by the models on which they are based. Here, 
the formulation of models (1) and (2) restricts our simulations at least in two 
respects. First, the indirect impact of import prices via labour costs, 
productivity gains through competition and other channels is beyond our 
simulations; second, the aggregate and dynamic features of the models make it 
impossible to separate out the individual contributions of EtΠ  versus DtΠ  
entirely. 
4. Empirical results of globalisation effects 
We are now in the position of discussing the globalisation effects found 
from the econometric exercise. First, let us examine the relevant parameter 
estimates in Table 4. It is remarkable that all the countries except Sweden and 
the US fit in with model (2). Of the import price variable, the effects are of the 
globalisation-intensified type, ie the openness-index weighted type for six out 
of the ten countries in terms of the short-run variable and for six to seven of 
them in terms of the long-run variable. Moreover, unemployment variable is 
found to be the openness-index weighted type in the cases of Belgium, Italy 
and the Netherlands; the domestic output gap variable is found to be the 
openness-index weighted type in the cases of Italy and the UK; and the short-
                                                 
7 Our baseline simulation is in fact very close to the actual CPI series because of both the 
small residuals in our estimated equations and the relatively good fit of our calculated import 
price series to the actual ones (see Figure 2). 
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run wage rate variable falls also into the type in the cases of Canada, France, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. If we focus ourselves on the import price 
variable irrespective of the openness index specification, we find that the long-
run import price effect is present in all but the Italian models, and that the 
effect is stronger than that of the wage variable in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland. A closer examination reveals that these four 
countries share the common features of both having their openness indices 
well above 30% and their shares of import from the emerging-market 
economies greater than 15% (see Figure 1). To a certain extent, the short-run 
import price effect is more striking. It is not only present in all the ten cases 
but also dominantly positive, with virtually an accelerative effect for more 
than half of the cases (ie close to the specification of jtMp −ΔΔ  with a positive 
coefficient). Hence on grounds of model (1), the evidence constitutes an over 
overwhelming case for the globalisation hypothesis. Even if on grounds of (2), 
the case is adequately strong. 
Our results on the role of import price are in broad agreement with those 
reported in Pain et al (2006, 2008), although our long-run parameter estimates 
show too distinct heterogeneity to support their grouped estimates or assumed 
homogeneity. Nevertheless, it is clear from Table 4 that omission of the long-
run effect is a model specification error in those studies which only consider 
short-run Phillips curve inflation models. It is also clear from the table that the 
lag structures of the short-run variables are more complicated and 
heterogeneous than what have been assumed in most of the previous empirical 
studies. 
Let us now look at the simulation results given in Figures 4-6 and Table 
5. Figure 4 shows how inflation would have differed from the baseline 
inflation if the trade openness had remained unchanged at the 1994Q1 level, 
O
Qi
O
it rr 11994= . There are only eight series in Figure 4, since the Swedish and the 
US models are the simple type without the openness effect, as shown from 
Table 4. It is discernible from Figure 4 as well as Table 5 that the impact of 
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the openness variable, Oitr , on inflation vary considerably from country to 
country, except for inflation persistence where there the impact is negligible 
(see Table 5), and that increases in openness have a deflationary impact for 
Italy, a negligible impact for the UK, a fluctuating impact for France, Belgium 
and Canada and a relatively strong inflationary impact for Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. As mentioned above, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland share the features of having the long-run import price 
parameters larger than the wage parameters and of being more open to the 
emerging market economies. The simulated inflationary impact by openness 
can be interpreted as reflecting the fact that inflation rates have been generally 
higher in the emerging market economies than the developed countries. On the 
whole, it is difficult to generalise the directional impact of the degrees of trade 
openness on inflation in terms of both its level and its variability. 
In comparison, it is easy to conclude a generally deflationary impact on 
inflation of the rising shares of imports from the emerging market economies. 
As seen from Figure 5 and also Table 5, holding the import shares constant at 
the 1994Q1 level would result in higher inflation, with the maximum impact 
found for the US (1.4 percentage point), the Netherlands (1.2 percentage point) 
and Germany ( 0.3 percentage point). Although generally small and different 
across the ten countries (ranging from 0.04 to 1.4 percentage point), the 
simulated result illustrates clearly that increasing imports from the emerging 
market economies have led to lower inflation in general. However, it is 
unclear if the imports have led to more stable inflation, as shown in Table 5. 
It is natural to relate the deflationary impact of the increasing imports to 
the relatively cheap products by the emerging market economies. Such a price 
impact is examined in the next scenario. As clearly seen from Figure 6 and 
Table 5, realignment of the price levels of the emerging market economies to 
those of the developed countries would cause higher inflation in general and 
the impact is somewhat stronger than that of the previous scenario, although it 
remains unclear if the lower prices have led to more stable inflation. Again, 
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the US, the Netherlands and Germany are the countries which demonstrate 
relatively the largest deflationary impact. Similar to scenario 1, there is little 
overall effects on inflation persistence of scenarios 2 and 3 concerning the 
disaggregate effects by the emerging-market economies. 
Let us now look at the simulation results country by country. In the 
Belgium case, openness had an inflationary impact during 1994-2001 and 
2004-2007, but a deflationary impact during 2001-2004 (see Figure 4). The 
overall impact is inflationary and also variability enhancing, as shown in Table 
5. The impact of the share of imports from the emerging market economies is 
deflationary and very small, with a maximum of 0.04 percentage point (see 
Figure 5) or less than 1% difference from the baseline level (see Table 5). The 
impact of the import prices from the emerging market economies is also 
deflationary and small, with a maximum of 0.07 percentage point (see Figure 
6) or less than 2% difference from the baseline level (see Table 5). The effects 
of these two scenarios on both inflation variability and persistence are 
negligibly small.  
In the case of Canada, the openness index had a deflationary impact 
before 2002, and turned to inflationary thereafter, and the switch is most 
noticeable from Table 5, where it is seen to have concurred with a switching 
impact on the variability. The effects of the next two scenarios resemble the 
case of Belgium, only with larger magnitudes, as shown in Table 5. It is also 
interesting to note that imports from the emerging market economies have 
exerted an overall stabilising effect as far as the inflation variability of the full 
period is concerned. 
The openness impact in the French case is almost the opposite of the 
Canadian case. The impact was mostly positive before the year of 2002, 
became significantly negative during 2002-2004, and returned to positive 
thereafter (see Figure 4). A notable feature of this scenario is the large 
stabilising effect on the inflation variability, as seen from Table 5. The 
deflationary impact of both the share and the price of imports from the 
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emerging market economies here resembles the previous two cases, with the 
exception of the period of 1995-1999, where the price impact was 
considerably bigger.  
Germany tops the group when it comes to the openness impact and the 
impact is notably inflationary, above 60% of the baseline rates on average (see 
Figure 4 and Table 5). Again, the deflationary impact of the next two 
scenarios in the present case is similar to the previous cases, only with much 
larger magnitudes. The impact of the import prices from emerging market 
economies on German inflation is over 30% of the baseline rates (see Table 5). 
It is, however, difficult to judge from the inflation variability statistics if the 
impact has been stabilising inflation. 
Italy poses an opposite case to Germany in the openness scenario. The 
openness variable  has shown clearly a deflationary and stabilising impact on 
the Italian inflation, with the maximum difference of 1.3 percentage point (see 
Figure 4) or above 20% of the baseline rates (see Table 5). However, the 
impact of scenarios 2 is found to remain extremely small and negative (see 
Figure 5 and Table 5). The impact of scenario 3 is slightly bigger and turns 
from inflationary to deflationary around 1997 (see Figure 6). There is some 
evidence that both scenarios have helped stabilising inflation (see Table 5). 
The case of the Netherlands is similar to that of Germany as far as the 
inflation rates are concerned (see Table 5). In the openness scenario, the 
impact remains largely inflationary, except for the period 2002-2004 (see 
Figure 4). In scenarios 2 and 3, the deflationary impacts remain visibly strong, 
especially in the latter scenario, with the impact remaining above 1 percentage 
point since the late 1990s and exceeding 1.5 percentage point in 2006 (see 
Figure 6). The only noted difference from the German case is the inflation 
stabilising effect of the first scenario (see Table 5). 
The openness scenario does not apply to Sweden because its end model 
form through model reduction is equation (1). The impact of both the share of 
imports and import prices from emerging market economies is clearly 
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deflationary, about 20% of the baseline rates as shown in Figures 5 and 6 as 
well as Table 5. However, the impact is found not to be inflation stabilising 
(see Table 5). 
Switzerland is another case which resembles that of Germany, only at a 
smaller scale. The impact of the openness variable is both inflationary and 
variability enhancing (see Figure 4 and Table 5), while the impacts of 
scenarios 2 and 3 are deflationary and stabilising (see Figures 5 and 6 and 
Table 5). 
In the UK case, the openness impact is hardly visible from Figure 4, 
though it has remained above 2% on the inflationary side with a small 
stabilising effect (see Table 5). Again, the impacts in scenarios 2 and 3 are 
clearly deflationary, with negligible effect on the inflation variability, but not 
quite inflation stabilising. 
The US is another case where the openness scenario is not applicable. 
Here, it is noticeable from Figure 1 that the openness index of the US remains 
exceptionally low (around 14% on average) as compared to the other nine 
countries. On the other hand, the US enjoys the highest and also fastest growth 
of the share of imports from the emerging market economies (see the dotted 
line in Figure 1). That helps to explain our simulation results from scenarios 2 
and 3, which turn out to be both substantially deflationary and inflation 
stabilising (see Figures 5 and 6 and Table 5). The maximum deflationary 
impact of scenario 2 reaches 1.4 percentage point, while that of scenario 3 
exceeds 1.5 percentage point. It is particularly noticeable from Table 5 that 
relatively low import prices from the emerging market economies have helped 
to reduce the inflation variability by over 25%, the largest of all the ten cases.  
5. Concluding remarks 
The econometric exercise has yielded strong and relatively robust 
evidence of globalisation on domestic inflation of ten countries from G10. The 
evidence is shown in terms of both significant coefficient estimates 
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corresponding to variables representing globalisation effects and also model 
simulation results. 
Among the relevant variables, import price has been verified as a key 
variable. In the majority of the ten cases, this variable is found to exert an 
increasing impact through a joint effect with an openness index in the long run 
and also a roughly accelerative effect in the short run. However, our country-
by-country model search shows that dynamic channels and magnitudes of 
globalisation to domestic inflation are highly heterogeneous, making it 
questionable the suitability of evaluating the impact of globalisation by panel 
models or a priori tightly parameterised models. 
The heterogeneity is probably most noticeable from the trade openness 
channel. The openness variable drops out from the model reduction in two 
(Sweden and the US) out of the ten cases and its presence in the rest cases 
takes a variety of forms. Model simulation by controlling the openness 
variable illustrates that its impact could be either inflationary or deflationary in 
terms of the level of inflation as well as either aggravating or alleviating in 
terms of inflation variability. The result supports White’s (2008) conclusion 
that globalisation could result in episodes of low and stable domestic inflation 
as equally well as episodes of rising and more volatile inflation. 
What we find more homogeneous from the simulation results are (i) the 
lack of globalisation impact on inflation persistence and (ii) a generally 
deflationary impact owing to imports from low-cost emerging market 
economies. However, there is some evidence that the deflationary impact has 
been gradually diminishing and that its associated impact on mitigating 
inflation variability has been weakening. The finding indicates that the rising 
supply of cheap goods from low-cost emerging market economies has indeed 
made non-negligible contribution to the state of low inflation in the advanced 
economies, but that the benefit does not extend to the state of stable inflation 
during the Great Moderation era. 
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Appendix Data sources and derivation: 
 
CPI: 2005=100, IFS (International Financial Statistics, IMF), except for 
Germany where the data come from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators database; annual inflation is calculated from these CPI 
quarterly series. 
Nominal unit labour cost: IFS except for Switzerland where the data come 
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database. 
Output gap: Deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP as percentage of 
potential GDP; Quarterly data from Datastream except for Belgium and 
Switzerland where the data are annual from Datastream interpolated into 
quarterly ones by the authors.  
Import price index: national currency, derived from converting US$ import 
price index (2005=100) by the appropriate exchange rate; all series from 
IFS except for France where the data is from CEIC database 
(http://www.ceicdata.com/). 
Export price index in US$: 2005=100; IFS except for China, the Czech 
Republic, France, Libya, Russia and Taiwan; the data for the Czech 
Republic, Libya and Russia are from Datastream, the data for France 
(export deflator) and Taiwan are from CEIC, and the data for China are 
from He (2010). Those data originally not in US$ are first converted into 
US$ via exchange rate and then rebased to 2005=100. 
Imports, exports and the GDP: national currency, from IFS.  
Exchange rates: national currency/US$, from IFS, period average. 
Trade shares: Calculated from DOT (Direction of Trade, IMF). 
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Figure 1. The openness index, Oitr  (solid line) and the share of import from emerging market 
economies, EtW  (dotted line) 
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Figure 2. Actual import price, MitP  (solid line) and Calculated import price, 
M
itPˆ  (dotted line)  
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Figure 3. PPP based import price calculated for developed countries, DtΠ  (solid line) and 
emerging market economies, EtΠ  (dotted line) 
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Figure 4. Simulated impact of the openness indices (solid line: baseline inflation; dotted line: 
simulated inflation with Oitr  fixed at the 1994Q1 value) 
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 29
 
Figure 5. Simulated impact of the shares of imports from the developed countries versus the 
emerging market economies (solid line: baseline inflation; dotted line: simulated 
inflation with EtW  fixed to its 1994Q1 value) 
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Figure 6. Simulated impact of the import prices from the emerging market economies (solid 
line: baseline inflation; dotted line: simulated inflation with DtEt Π=Π ) 
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Table 1. Correlation coefficients of CPI inflation 
 1998Q1 – 2010Q3  
 BEL CAN CHE DEU FRA UK ITA NLD SWE US
BEL 1 0.37 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.50 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.70
CAN 0.41 1 0.61 0.08 0.77 0.68 0.67 -0.20 0.78 0.69
CHE 0.60 0.32 1 0.72 0.71 0.65 0.75 0.29 0.82 0.72
DEU 0.57 0.06 0.85 1 0.40 0.28 0.42 0.60 0.41 0.44
FRA 0.79 0.50 0.67 0.62 1 0.71 0.81 -0.09 0.78 0.78
UK 0.43 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.47 1 0.63 -0.11 0.75 0.75
ITA 0.42 0.12 0.74 0.69 0.62 0.22 1 -0.02 0.82 0.63
NLD 0.40 0.20 0.37 0.47 0.32 -0.09 0.44 1 0.05 0.05
SWE 0.57 0.31 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.19 0.62 0.50 1 0.67
US 0.73 0.60 0.61 0.48 0.71 0.55 0.46 0.20 0.42 1
Note: The coefficients in bold in the upper triangle indicate those which are larger than their corresponding 
coefficients in the lower triangle.  
 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients of wage rates 
 1998Q1 – 2009Q4  
19
92
Q
1 
 
  2
00
9Q
4 
BEL CAN CHE DEU FRA UK ITA NLD SWE US
BEL 1 -0.44 0.33 0.26 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.36 0.39 -0.04
CAN -0.20 1 -0.37 -0.27 0.22 0.33 0.52 -0.05 -0.08 0.53
CHE -0.04 -0.33 1 0.39 0.25 -0.06 -0.04 0.27 0.51 0.15
DEU 0.47 0.07 -0.11 1 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.57 0.04
FRA 0.19 0.28 0.03 0.42 1 0.02 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.61
UK 0.23 0.25 -0.18 0.01 -0.01 1 0.19 -0.08 0.46 0.25
ITA 0.21 0.49 -0.23 0.16 0.45 0.26 1 0.44 0.29 0.55
NLD 0.46 0.07 -0.14 0.47 0.54 -0.04 0.48 1 0.21 0.37
SWE 0.50 -0.01 -0.03 0.42 0.32 0.56 0.38 0.27 1 0.35
US -0.07 0.40 -0.01 0.33 0.49 -0.18 0.29 0.34 0.01 1
Note: The coefficients in bold in the upper triangle indicate those which are larger than their corresponding 
coefficients in the lower triangle.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients of import prices 
 1998Q1 – 2010Q3  
 
Energy Brent Food BEL CAN CHE DEU FRA UK ITA NLD SWE US
Energy 1 0.89 0.45 0.19 -0.17 0.45 0.37 0.53 0.58 0.24 0.54 0.60 0.36
Brent 0.90 1 0.46 0.30 -0.01 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.69 0.30 0.68 0.69 0.47
Food 0.56 0.54 1 0.19 -0.17 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.12
BEL 0.08 0.23 0.26 1 0.28 0.38 0.66 0.51 0.57 0.36 0.58 0.63 0.48
CAN -0.27 -0.10 -0.20 0.28 1 -0.01 0.47 0.14 0.21 0.38 0.19 0.21 0.41
CHE 0.50 0.56 0.28 0.14 -0.08 1 0.67 0.71 0.78 0.12 0.76 0.76 0.47
DEU 0.28 0.44 0.23 0.57 0.57 0.45 1 0.76 0.84 0.48 0.80 0.89 0.72
FRA 0.50 0.65 0.35 0.43 0.24 0.61 0.79 1 0.83 0.31 0.84 0.79 0.63
UK 0.60 0.73 0.53 0.45 0.25 0.58 0.76 0.77 1 0.50 0.89 0.96 0.70
ITA 0.12 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.42 -0.02 0.46 0.22 0.56 1 0.34 0.54 0.54
NLD 0.49 0.66 0.44 0.46 0.17 0.62 0.70 0.90 0.81 0.27 1 0.86 0.59
SWE 0.60 0.72 0.55 0.54 0.25 0.57 0.83 0.77 0.93 0.56 0.77 1 0.71
US 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.37 0.45 0.21 0.63 0.36 0.53 0.58 0.33 0.58 1
Note: Reuters CRB energy price index; Brent crude from IMF. The coefficients in bold in the upper triangle indicate 
those which are larger than their corresponding coefficients in the lower triangle. 
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Table 4. Key estimates and test statistics from model reduction of the inflation models (1), (2) and (2a):  
 jtp −Δ  1−itec  jtw −Δ  jtMp −Δ  jtu −  G jty −  Residual tests 
Normality [p 
value]
Homogeneity 
[p  value]
BEL 0.726 -0.017 0.4 0.1 0.017 -0.017 -0.003 0.634 3.108 0.248
[.086] [.008] [.007] [.001] [.211] [.979]
[.096] [.081] [.056] [.109]
CAN 0.677 -0.329 -0.072 0.75 0.25 0.072 0.033 -0.02 0.001 0.648 0.039 1.89
[.117] [.118] [.043] [.012] [.011] [.008] [.0004] [.981] [.052]
[.081] [.035] [.048] [.036] [.093] [.126] [.262]
FRA 0.73 -0.171 0.45 0.15 -0.089 0.069 -0.071 -0.002 0.888 1.927 0.886
[.06] [.029] [.027] [.007] [.011] [.0003] [.382] [.624]
[.061] [.049] [.041] [.614]* [.171] [.046]
DEU 0.788 -0.077 0.2 0.3 0.04 -0.027 0.865 2.399 0.792
[.047] [.022] [.007] [.006] [.301] [.612]
[.097] [.227] [.115] [.04]
ITA 0.889 -0.053 1 0 -0.15 -0.177 -0.013 0.006 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.973 5.694 0.527
[.032] [.012] [.043] [.041] [.005] [.001] [.001] [.0005] [.0004] [.058] [.929]
[.038] [.037] [.052] [.035] [.081] [.032] [.031] [.074] [.08]
NLD 0.658 -0.057 0.25 0.75 -0.017 0.015 0.007 -0.009 0.865 4.723 2.009
[.074] [.011] [.005] [.007] [.002] [.002] [.094] [.04]
[.105] [.099] [.024] [.082] [.066] [.053]
SWE 0.764 -0.231 0.1 0.4 0.218 -0.142 -0.001 0.864 0.645 0.609
[.058] [.048] [.025] [.026] [.0002] [.724] [.799]
[.081] [.27] [.076] [.05] [.113]
CHE 0.768 -0.339 -0.2 0.1 0.15 0.016 0.027 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.88 0.619 0.838
[.104] [.094] [.03] [.007] [.005] [.0006] [.0009] [.0006] [.734] [.638]
[.137] [.249] [.187] [.172] [.223] [.16] [.035] [.06]
UK 0.919 -0.379 -0.219 0.7 0.3 0.421 0.098 -0.062 0.004 -0.005 0.919 0.904 1.473
[.085] [.087] [.034] [.079] [.02] [.02] [.001] [.001] [.636] [.194]
[.072] [.081] [.125] [.123] [.035] [.149] [.088] [.071]
0.919 -0.378 -0.206 0.7 0.3 0.421 0.101 -0.063 0.006 -0.007 0.919 0.833 1.315
[.085] [.088] [.032] [.079] [.02] [.019] [.002] [.002] [.659] [.275]
[.073] [.081] [.121] [.127] [.042] [.168] [.112] [.09]
US 0.6 -0.236 0.75 0.2 0.155 -0.08 -0.004 0.01 -0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.954 5.207 1.196
[.088] [.051] [.009] [.017] [.001] [.003] [.002] [.0009] [.0008] [.074] [.307]
[.06] [.04] [.107] [.035] [.03] [.032] [.035] [.046] [.05]
 1κ  2κ  1λ  2λ  0β  1β  2β 2α 1α  0λ 1δ  2δ  3δ  4δ  4ϕ 1ϕ  2ϕ  3ϕ γ  2R
 
Note: Statistics in brackets below the parameter estimates are standard errors; the bracketed statistics below the standard errors are Hansen parameter constancy tests(the 5% critical value being 
0.47); parameter estimates in bold are weighted variables. Sample 1992Q1-2010Q3; exception: Belgium up to 2007Q4; Only versions reported are those which pass the encompassing 
tests, with UK having two versions. The short-run coefficient estimates for the import price variable in the Belgium case is actually the result of model reduction on an acceleration 
variable, ie tMpΔΔ . 
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Table 5. Summary impact on inflation from model simulations 
 Average inflation 
(sample mean in %) 
Inflation variability 
(standard deviation)
Inflation persistence 
(Marques’s r)  
 1995-2008 2000-2008 1995-2008 2000-2008 1995-2008 2000-2008 
Belgium 1.79 1.85 0.28 0.31 0.56 0.60 
Scenario 1 -4.2% -2.1% -4.2% -6.3% 0.56 0.54 
Scenario 2 +0.7% +0.9% -0.1% -1.0% 0.56 0.60 
Scenario 3 +1.5% +1.8% +0.1% -1.0% 0.55 0.60 
Canada 2.03 2.19 0.36 0.32 0.51 0.49 
Scenario 1 +5.5% -1.9% -7.7% +22.0% 0.53 0.54 
Scenario 2 +4.5% +6.0% +8.2% -2.6% 0.49 0.49 
Scenario 3 +8.6% +9.3% +5.4% -2.0% 0.49 0.49 
France 1.65 1.98 0.63 0.47 0.44 0.51 
Scenario 1 -2.4% +0.3% +29.7% +57.8% 0.55 0.51 
Scenario 2 +2.5% +2.9% +3.0% -1.3% 0.42 0.54 
Scenario 3 +6.2% +2.0% -10.0% -2.9% 0.42 0.51 
Germany 1.45 1.67 0.49 0.43 0.55 0.51 
Scenario 1 -62.2% -60.9% -34.9% -44.1% 0.51 0.46 
Scenario 2 +12.2% +14.4% +8.2% -9.9% 0.47 0.54 
Scenario 3 +31.6% +21.3% -8.6% +12.8% 0.60 0.60 
Italy 2.37 3.24 1.41 0.66 0.36** 0.46 
Scenario 1 +23.7% +20.7% +15.7% +48.3% 0.53 0.46 
Scenario 2 -1.3% -1.5% -1.0% +2.1% 0.38* 0.46 
Scenario 3 -0.1% +1.5% +2.9% +4.1% 0.42 0.46 
Netherlands 2.21 2.56 1.16 1.27 0.64** 0.60 
Scenario 1 -42.7% -34.9% +10.0% +11.0% 0.62* 0.54 
Scenario 2 +24.1% +28.7% +3.7% -15.3% 0.60 0.57 
Scenario 3 +51.3% +47.5% -2.4% -10.0% 0.64** 0.60 
Sweden 1.09 1.31 2.35 1.52 0.56 0.49 
Scenario 2 +17.5% +21.7% -3.1% -4.9% 0.55 0.46 
Scenario 3 +27.8% +23.9% -2.1% -8.9% 0.55 0.49 
Switzerland 0.47 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.51 0.51 
Scenario 1 -46.3% -35.7% -16.3% -16.4% 0.49 0.51 
Scenario 2 +5.7% +4.5% +5.0% +6.6% 0.51 0.51 
Scenario 3 +3.1% +3.6% +7.1% +7.6% 0.53 0.51 
UK 1.94 2.14 1.10 0.95 0.58 0.60 
Scenario 1 -2.3% -2.2% +2.5% +5.2% 0.58 0.57 
Scenario 2 +9.2% +11.1% +0.7% -1.4% 0.56 0.60 
Scenario 3 +15.8% +14.6% -0.7% -0.3% 0.64** 0.60 
US 2.68 3.03 1.01 0.86 0.49 0.40 
Scenario 2 +12.7% +13.5% +7.4% +5.6% 0.49 0.34* 
Scenario 3 +25.0% +19.8% +29.2% +26.0% 0.47 0.40 
Note: Marques’s (2004) measure of inflation persistence, r, is defined as 
T
nr −=1 , where n stands for 
the number of times the series crosses the mean during a time interval with T+1 observations. r 
is normally distributed with mean 0.5 and variance of 
T
5.0 . The superscripts ** and * in the 
last two columns indicate the corresponding r exceeding the significance levels of 95% and 90% 
respectively. 
          Of the first four columns, The summary statistics in the first rows of each country are calculated 
from the baseline simulation. The statistics in the rows of three scenarios are calculated as 
percentage differences of the scenarios against the baseline. 
 
